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What makes the Palestinian Authority run? A reminder!

Is the vision of the Palestinian Authority limited to the establishment of a state in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)?  Is the vision of the Palestinian Authority amenable to alteration through financial inducements? Shouldn’t the pursuit of peace be based on a realization of the de facto – rather than hopeful – vision of the Palestinian Authority?

The Middle East context

In the Arab/Muslim Middle East – contrary to Western democracies – regimes are authoritarian, suppressing the majority. They are not scrutinized by legislators and constituents, unconstrained by checks and balances, unchallenged by election cycles, and highly motivated by long-term visions. These visions quash constituents’ preference, and supersede tempting Western financial packages.

Therefore, unlike the relatively short-term, election-driven strategy pursued by Western policy-makers, Arab policy-makers are driven by long-term strategy and vision, supported by short term tactics, which frequently aim to mislead, while camouflaging the actual vision.

The de facto, pre-1967 Palestinian vision

According to the de facto Palestinian vision – as documented by the current K-12 Palestinian hate curriculum – Palestine extends from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, erasing the “infidel” Jewish State (The term Palaistine was coined by the Greeks in the 5th century BCE, referring to the Land of Israel).

The de facto Palestinian vision was determined before the 1967 Six Day War; before the Jewish State reunited Jerusalem and regained control of the mountain ridges of Judea and Samaria (which was renamed the West Bank during the 1950 Jordanian occupation).

The Palestinian de facto vision was articulated by the 1964 charter of the PLO, which is the source of power of the Palestinian Authority, hence Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, leaders of the PLO, and therefore of the Palestinian Authority. The 33 articles of the PLO charter envision a multi-generational struggle for “the liberation” of the whole of British Mandate Palestine and the destruction of “Zionist occupation,” focusing on Tel Aviv, Haifa and the entire pre-1967 Israel.

The 1964 PLO charter did not refer to Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza – which were occupied by Jordan and Egypt – only to pre-1967 Israel.

The 1968 edition of the PLO charter – which is still in effect, in defiance of a 1993 (Oslo) PLO commitment to amend it and desist from terrorism and hate education – refers to the entire area from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean. It can be amended only by a 2/3 majority of the Palestinian National Council.

The boundaries of “liberated Palestine” are delineated by the PLO emblem, highlighting the pre-1967 area of Israel. It demonstrates that the crux of the conflict is not the size – but the existence – of the Jewish State.

Moreover, the largest organization within the PLO, Fatah – headed by Mahmoud Abbas – was established in 1959, eight years before the 1967 War, proclaiming the aim “to liberate Palestine,” from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, as displayed by the Fatah emblem.

The Palestinian ‘Phased Plan”

On September 13, 1993, a few hours before signing the Israel-Palestinian Oslo Accord on the White House lawn, Arafat told the Jordanian TV that the accord is an interim agreement – the first phase of the PLO’s June 1974 “Phased Plan.” The latter legitimizes the establishment of a Palestinian Authority over any part of British Mandate Palestine, as a beachhead for vanquishing the enemy, and establishing a Palestinian state over the whole of Palestine.

The August 14, 2009 and November 16, 1998, January 30, 1996 and May 10, 1994 speeches by Mahmoud Abbas and Arafat reiterated the step-by-step Palestinian tactic toward the attainment of the de facto Palestinian vision, drawing inspiration from Mohammed’s Hudaybiyya Treaty – a major precept of traditional and contemporary Islam and Arab policy-making.

The 628 AD Hudaybiyya Treaty – when Mohammed signed an agreement, regrouped, breached the agreement and vanquished his enemy in Mecca – has been a role model for agreements between Muslims and “infidel” entities.  These agreements do not constitute a goal, but rather a means. They are merely a truce, not a final peace – merely a stepping stone to victory over the “infidel.”

The Western challenge

In 2020, the Palestinian hate curriculum; the popularity of the anti-Semitic Mein Kampf and The Elders of Zion on the Palestinian street; the glorification of suicide bombers; the systematic incitement by the Palestinian clergy; the monthly subsidies to families of terrorists, and the bolstering of the terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza, underscore the de facto Palestinian vision.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned documentation – which is reflected by unprecedented Palestinian terrorism, hate education and violation of commitments – most Western democracies experience suspension of disbelief, overlooking the Palestinian walk.   They embrace the “screen-saving,” misleading Palestinian talk, and delude themselves that financial benefits might divert the Palestinian leadership from its real goal.

They ignore the fact that financial benefits have failed to produce intra-Arab peaceful coexistence during the last 1,400 years, and have not altered the de facto Palestinian vision despite unprecedented economic and political benefits extended by the 1993 Oslo Accord and by Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza.

As expected, each Israeli concession added fuel – not water – to the fire of Palestinian terrorism, which has not modified the pro-Palestinian Western policy.

The Western tendency to sacrifice reality on the altar of wishful-thinking and oversimplification has generated major blows to regional and global stability. This was demonstrated when Western democracies facilitated the 1978/79 emergence of Iran’s Ayatollahs, embraced Saddam Hussein until his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and welcomed the Arab Tsunami (since 2010) as if it were really an “Arab Spring” and ‘Facebook Revolution.” This bolstered Iran’s pursuit of conventional, ballistic and nuclear capabilities (2015), and crowned Arafat with a Nobel Prize for Peace (1994).

When it comes to the de facto Palestinian vision, will Western democracies learn from past, self-destructive mistakes by avoiding – or repeating – them?!




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President Biden’s pressure and Israel’s Judiciary Reform

Israel’s proposed Judiciary Reform ranks very low on President Biden’s order of priorities, far below scores of pressing domestic, foreign and national security threats and challenges.

Therefore, he has not studied the various articles of the reform, but leverages the explosive Israeli domestic controversy as a means to intensify pressure on Israel, in order to:

*Gradually, force Israel back to the 1967 ceasefire lines;
*End Jewish construction and proliferate Arab construction in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank);
*Advance the establishment of a Palestinian state on the mountain ridges of Judea and Samaria, which overpower the coastal sliver of pre-1967 Israel;
*Re-divide Jerusalem;
*Prevent game-changing Israeli military actions against Palestinian terrorists and Iran’s Ayatollahs.

Israel’s Judiciary Reform and US democracy

If the President and his advisors had studied the proposed reform, they would have noticed the Israeli attempt to adopt key features of the US democratic system, which would end the current situation of Israel’s Judiciary as Israel’s supreme branch of government. The reform aims to provide Israel’s Legislature and Executive branches with the effective authority (currently infringed by the Judiciary) to exercise the responsibility accorded to them by the constituency.

For example:

*Israeli Supreme Court Justices should not be appointed – as they are today – by a committee, which is controlled by Justices (who possess a veto power) and lawyers, but rather by a committee, dominated by legislators;

*The Attorney General and the Legal Advisors of Cabinet Departments should be appointed (and fired) by – and subordinated to – the Executive, not the Judiciary. Their role should be to advise, and not to approve or veto policy matters, as it is today. Their advice should not be binding, as it is today.

*Supreme Court Justices should not be empowered to overturn Basic Laws (Israel’s mini-Constitution).

*Supreme Court Justices should have a limited power to nullify and overturn legislation.

*Supreme Court Justices should decide cases according to the Basic Laws and existing legislation, and not resort to the reasonableness of the legislation (which is utterly subjective), as is the case today.

*The Supreme Court should not be able to overturn legislation by three – out of fifteen – Justices, as is the case today.

*The Supreme Court should be supreme to lower level courts, not to the Legislature and Executive, as it is today.

President Biden’s pressuring Israel

*President Biden’s pressuring Israel reflects the return of the US State Department to the center-stage of policy-making. The State Department opposed Israel’s establishment in 1948, has been a systematic critic of Israel since then, and has been consistently wrong on crucial Middle East issues.

*This pressure on Israel represents the multilateral and cosmopolitan worldview of the State Department establishment, in general, and Secretary Blinken and National Security Advisor Sullivan, in particular. This worldview espouses a common ideological and strategic denominator with the UN, International Organizations and Europe, rather than the unilateral US action of foreign policy and US national security. It examines the Middle East through Western lenses, assuming that dramatic financial and diplomatic gestures would convince Iran’s Ayatollahs and Palestinian terrorists to abandon deeply-rooted, fanatic ideologies in favor of peaceful-coexistence, enhanced standard of living and good-faith negotiation.  Middle East reality has proven such assumptions to be wrong.

*President Biden’s pressure mirrors the routine of presidential pressure on Israel since 1948 (except 2017-2020), which has always resulted in short-term tension/friction and occasional punishment, such as a suspension of delivery of military systems and not vetoing UN condemnations of Israel.

*However, since 1948, simultaneously with presidential pressure on Israel, there has been a dramatic enhancement of mutually-beneficial defense and commercial cooperation, as determined by vital US interests, recognizing Israel’s unique technological and military capabilities and growing role as a leading force and dollar multiplier for the US. Israel’s unique contribution to the US defense and aerospace industries, high tech sector, armed forces and intelligence has transcended US foreign aid to Israel, and has eclipsed US-Israel friction over less critical issues (e.g., the Palestinian issue).

*The current bilateral friction is very moderate compared to prior frictions, such as the Obama-Netanyahu tension over the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran; the US’ brutal opposition to Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear reactors; the US’ ferocious resentment of Israel’s application of its law to the Golan Heights; the US’ determined opposition to the reunification of Jerusalem, and the renewal of Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights and Greater Jerusalem; and the US’ strong-handed pressure for Israel to withdraw to the suicidal 1947 Partition lines; etc.

*In hindsight, the US pressure on Israel was based on erroneous assumptions, which could have undermined vital US interests, if not for Israel’s defiance of pressure.  For example, Israel’s refraining from bombing Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007 would have confronted the US and the world at-large with a potential nuclear confrontation in 1991 and a potential Syrian nuclearized civil war since 2011.

*Rogue Middle East regimes consider US pressure on Israel as an erosion of Israel’s posture of deterrence, and therefore an inducement to the intensified threat of terrorism and war, which gravely destabilize the region and undermine US interests (while advancing the interests of China, Russia and Iran’s Ayatollahs), threatening the survival of pro-US vulnerable oil-producing Arab regimes.

*Most Israeli Prime Ministers – especially from Ben Gurion through Shamir – defied presidential pressure, which yielded short-term friction and erosion in popularity, but accorded Israel long-term enhanced strategic respect. On a rainy day, the US prefers allies, which stand up to pressure, and are driven by clear principles and national security requirements.

*Succumbing to – and accommodating – US presidential pressure ignores precedents, overlooks Israel’s base of support in the co-equal, co-determining US Legislature, undermines Israel’s posture of deterrence, whets the appetite of anti-US and anti-Israel rogue regimes, and adds fuel to the Middle East fire at the expense of Israel’s and US’ national security and economic interests.

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Videos

The post-1967 turning point of US-Israel cooperation

Israeli benefits to the US taxpayer exceed US foreign aid to Israel

Iran - A Clear And Present Danger To The USA

Exposing the myth of the Arab demographic time bomb