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Testing the Demographic Concept of Doom

A military concept of arrogance swept Israel’s leadership forty years ago. It required a heroic performance by the IDF to snatch victory from the jaws of oblivion during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

A geo-political concept of a peace-driven Middle East – the 1993 Oslo Accord and its derivative, the Two State Solution – swept Israel’s leadership twenty years ago. It has been trounced systematically by the terror/war-driven imploding Arab Street.

A demographic concept of doom – dismissing the prospect of massive Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel and projecting an Arab majority there – was defied 116 years ago and 65 years ago, respectively, by Theodore Herzl, who established the Zionist Congress and David Ben Gurion, who established the Jewish State.

The demographic concept of doom was fended off by Israeli leaders until 1992.  They initiated significant waves of Jewish immigration, in defiance of the demographic establishment, multiplied Israel’s Jewish population ten fold since 1948, and dramatically expanded Jewish communities in Greater Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria.

However, the demographic concept of doom has consumed Israel’s leadership since 1992, in spite of Israel’s unprecedented economic, military, political and demographic resources, and irrespective of the well-documented, systematic, 116 year old bankruptcy of that concept.

An 8% Jewish minority in the Land of Israel did not deter Herzl in 1897A 55% Jewish majority within the Partition Plan boundary of the Jewish State did not deter Ben Gurion in 1948From a minority of 9% and 39% in 1897 and 1948, respectively, in the combined area of Judea, Samaria and “pre-1967 Israel,” Jews have surged to a 66% majority in 2013, benefitting from a robust tailwind of fertility and immigration.

The number of Israeli Jews is 6.3 million (including some 300,000 Soviet immigrants who are not yet recognized as Jews by the Rabbinate) next to 1.7 million Israeli Arabs and 1.65 million Judean and Samarian Arabs.  The latter has been artificially inflated by one million, in order to offset the arrival of one million immigrants from the USSR during the 1990s. The Palestinian misrepresentation aims at scaring Israel into territorial concessions.

The Palestinian population census “is a civil Intifada,” said the head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, during a December 11, 1997 New York Times interview.

Over 400,000 overseas residents, who have been away for over a year, are included in the Palestinian census, contrary to international standards. About 300,000 Israeli ID card-bearing Jerusalem Arabs and 100,000 Judea and Samaria Arabs (who married Israeli Arabs) are doubly counted: as Israeli Arabs by Israel and as West Bankers by the Palestinian Authority.  In addition, Palestinian births are over-reported, deaths are under-reported (in order to sustain UNRWA subsidies) and a substantial net-emigration is ignored.

In September, 2006, the World Bank documented a 32% gap between the Palestinian Authority number and the actual number of births. Still, for the sake of political correctness (central bureau of statistics are assumed to  be accurate) and the peace process, the Israeli government echoes the official Palestinian numbers without proper scrutiny and auditing.

A surge of 62% occurred in the annual Jewish births since 1995 (from 80,400 to 130,000) despite the decline in fertility among the ultra-orthodox and due to the bolstered fertility among secular Jews, while Israeli Arab births increased by a mere 10% (from 36,500 to 40,000).  During the first half of 2013, the number of Jewish births (including births among the 300,000 immigrants from the USSR) was 77% of total births, compared with 69% in 1995.  In 2013, there are 3.5 Jewish births per 1 Arab birth, compared with a 2.3:1 ratio in 1995.  In 2013, the Jewish and Arab fertility rate has converged at three births per women in their ‘20s and ‘30s, while Jewish women trend above three and Arab women trend below three.  The average Israeli born Jewish woman has already surpassed three births, exceeding any Middle Eastern Muslim country, other than Yemen, Iraq and Jordan, which are speedily trending downward.   

Since 2001, the number of Jewish emigrants has decreased and the number of returning expatriates has increased. Aliya has been sustained annually since 1882, while Arab net-emigration from Judea and Samaria has been a fixture since 1950.

Moreover, modernity has Westernized Muslim demography – all over the Middle East, including the Bedouins – in an unprecedented pace: enhanced women’s rights, expanded education among women, family planning (contraceptives), rapidly declining teen-pregnancy, urbanization, all time high median wedding age, etc.

In 1967, Israel’s demographic establishment followed in the footsteps of Herzl’s and Ben Gurion’s detractors, urging Prime Minister Eshkol to evacuate Judea and Samaria, lest there be an Arab majority by 1987.  On July 6, 1987, Prof. Arnon Sofer, one of Israel’s leading demographers of doom, proclaimed that an Arab majority was expected by 2000.  Systematically moving the “goal posts,” Prof. Sofer warned on August 3, 1988 of an Arab majority by 2008.   He joined Prof. Sergio DellaPergolla, a veteran demographer of doom, who dismissed on October 23, 1987 any prospect of Jewish immigration from the USSR.  One million Jews arrived!

The current 66% Jewish majority in the combined area of the pre-1967 Israel, Judea and Samaria would catapult to an 80% majority in 2035, if Israel pro-actively realizes the Aliyah window of opportunity of 500,000 Jews, in the next ten years, from the former USSR, France, England, Germany, Argentina and the USA. 

The suggestion that Jews are doomed to become a minority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, and that Israel should concede geography in order to secure demography, is either dramatically-mistaken or outrageously-misleading.

 

 

 




Videos

The post-1967 turning point of US-Israel cooperation

Israeli benefits to the US taxpayer exceed US foreign aid to Israel

Iran - A Clear And Present Danger To The USA

Exposing the myth of the Arab demographic time bomb

2023 demographic update: no Arab demographic time bomb

Demography west of the Jordan River

In 2023, Israel is the only Western democracy endowed with a relatively high fertility rate, that facilitates further economic growth, which is not dependent upon migrant labor.  Moreover, Israel’s thriving demography provides for bolstered national security (larger classes of recruits), economy and technology and a more confident foreign policy.

In 2023, contrary to projections made by the demographic establishment at the end of the 19th century and during the 1940s, Israel’s Jewish fertility rate is higher than the fertility rates in all Muslim countries other than Iraq and the sub-Sahara Muslim countries.

In 2023 (based on the latest data of 2021), the Jewish fertility rate of 3.13 births per woman is higher than the 2.85 Arab fertility rate (as it has been since 2016) and the 3.01 Arab-Muslim fertility rate (as it has been since 2020).

In 2023, Israel’s Jewish fertility rate is higher than any Arab country other than Iraq’s.

In 2023, there is a race (which started in the 1990s) between the Jewish and Arab fertility rates, unlike the race between the Arab fertility rate and Jewish Aliyah (immigration), which took place in 1949-1990s (while the Jewish fertility rate was relatively low).

In 2023, the Westernization of Arab demography persists as a derivative of modernity, urbanization, women’s enhanced social status, women’s enrollment in higher education and increased use of contraceptives.

In 2023, in contrast to conventional demographic wisdom, Israel is not facing a potential Arab demographic time bomb in the combined areas of Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and pre-1967 Israel. In fact, the Jewish State benefits from a robust tailwind of fertility rate and net-immigration.

In 2023, the demographic and policy-making establishment persists in reverberating the official Palestinian numbers without due-diligence (auditing), ignoring a 100% artificial inflation of the population numbers: inclusion of overseas resident, double-counting of Jerusalem Arabs and Israeli Arabs married to Judea and Samaria Arabs, inflated birth – and deflated death – data (as documented below).

In 2023, Israel is facing a potential wave of Aliyah (Jewish immigration) of some 500,000 Olim from the Ukraine, Russia, other former Soviet republics, France, Britain, Germany, Argentina, the USA, etc., which requires Israel to approach pro-active Aliyah policy as a top national priority.

In 2023, the Jewish demographic momentum persists (since 1995) with the secular Jewish sector making the difference, while the ultra-orthodox sector is experiencing a slight decline in fertility rate.

Jewish demographic momentum

*The number of Israeli Jewish births in 2022 (137,566) was 71% higher than 1995 (80,400), while the number of Israeli Arab births in 2022 (43,417) was 19% higher than 1995 (36,500), as reported by the February 2023 Monthly Bulletin of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS).

*In 2022, Jewish births (137,566) were 76% of total births (180,983), compared to 69% in 1995.

*The fertility rate (number of births per woman) of Israeli secular Jewish women has trended upward during the last 25 years.

*Israeli Jewish women – who are second only to Iceland in joining the job market – are unique in experiencing a direct correlation between a rise of fertility rate, on the one hand, and a rise in urbanization, education, level of income, integration into the job market and a rise of wedding age, on the other hand.

*In 1969, Israel’s Arab fertility rate was 6 births higher than the Jewish fertility rate. In 2015, both fertility rates were at 3.13 births per woman, reflecting the dramatic Westernization of Arab demography, triggered by the enhanced social status of women, older wedding age (24), expanded participation of women in higher-education and the job market, and shorter reproductive time (25-45 rather than 16-55). According to Israel’s Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, in 2021, the Jewish fertility rate was 3.13 (and 3.27 with an Israeli-born Jewish father), while the overall Arab fertility rate was 2.85 and the Muslim fertility rate was 3 (Judea and Samaria Arab fertility rate – 3.02).  The average OECD fertility rate is 1.61 births per woman.

*The unique growth in Israel’s Jewish fertility rate is attributed to optimism, patriotism, attachment to Jewish roots, communal solidarity, the Jewish high regard for raising children, frontier mentality and a declining number of abortions (34% decline since 1990).

*In 2022, there were 45,271 Israeli Jewish deaths, compared to 31,575 in 1996, a 43% increase (while the size of the population almost doubled!), which reflects a society growing younger. In 2022, there were 6,314 Israeli Arab deaths, compared to 3,089 in 1996, a 104% increase, which reflects a society growing older.  

In 2021, Israeli males’ life expectancy was 80.5 and Israeli females – 84.6.  Israel’s Arab life expectancy (78 per men and 82 per women) is higher than the US life expectancy (men – 73.2, women – 79.1). Life expectancy of Judea and Samaria Arabs: men – 74, women – 78.

*In 2022, the number of Israeli Jewish deaths was 33% of Jewish births, compared to 40% in 1995 – a symptom of a society growing younger. In 2022, the number of Israeli Arab deaths was 14.5% of Arab births, compared to 8% in 1995 – a symptom of a society growing older.

*Since 1995, the demographic trend has expanded the younger segment of Israel’s Jewish population, which provides a solid foundation for enhanced demography and economy.

*The positive Jewish demographic trend is further bolstered by Israel’s net-immigration, which consists of an annual Aliyah (Jewish immigration), reinforced by the shrinking scope of Israeli emigration: from 14,200 net-emigration in 1990 to 10,800 in 2020 (while the population doubled itself), which is higher than the 7,000 average annual net-emigration in recent years. The 2020 numbers may reflect the impact of COVID-19 on air travel.

Westernization of Arab demography

*A dramatic decline in the fertility rate from 9 births per woman in the 1960s to 3.02 births in 2022 is documented by the CIA World Factbook, which generally echoes the official Palestinian numbers. It reflects the Westernization of Arab demography in Judea and Samaria, which has been accelerated by the sweeping urbanization (from a 70% rural population in 1967 to a 77% urban population in 2022), as well as the rising wedding age for women (from 15 years old to 24), the substantial use of contraceptives (70% of Arab women in Judea and Samaria) and the shrinking of the reproductive period (from 16-55 to 24-45).

*The median age of Judea and Samaria Arabs is 22 years old, compared to 18 years old in 2005.

*The Westernization of fertility rates has characterized all Muslim countries, other than the sub-Sahara region: Jordan (which is very similar to the Judea and Samaria Arabs) – 2.9 births per woman, Iran – 1.9, Saudi Arabia – 1.9, Morocco – 2.27, Iraq – 3.17, Egypt – 2.76, Yemen – 2.91, United Arab Emirates – 1.65, etc.

*The number of Arab deaths in Judea and Samaria has been systematically under-reported (for political power and financial reasons), as documented by various studies since the British Mandate. For example, a recent Palestinian population census included Arabs who were born in 1845….

Artificially-inflated Palestinian numbers

*The demographic and policy-making establishment of Israel and the West refrains from auditing the official Palestinian data, and therefore it does not report the following well-documented Palestinian departure from a credible census:

*500,000 overseas residents, who have been away for over a year, are included in the Palestinian population census. However, internationally accepted procedures stipulate only a de-facto count. It was 325,000, as stated by the Head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in the aftermath of the first Palestinian census of 1997; increasing to 400,000 in 2005, as documented by the Palestinian Election Commission. The number grows daily because of overseas births.

*375,000 East Jerusalem Arabs, who possess Israeli ID cards, are doubly-counted. They are included in the Israeli census as well as in the Palestinian census. The number grows daily due to births.

*Over 150,000 Arabs from Gaza and (mostly) from Judea and Samaria, who married Israeli Arabs and received Israeli ID cards, are doubly-counted counted by Israel and by the Palestinian Authority. The number expands daily because of births.

*390,000 Arab emigrants from Judea and Samaria are not excluded from the population census of the Palestinian Authority. The latter ignores the annual net-emigration of mostly-young-Arabs from Judea and Samaria (20,000 annually in recent years). Net-emigration has been a systemic feature of the area, at least, since the Jordanian occupation in 1950. For example, 15,466 in 2022, 28,000 in 2021, 26,357 in 2019, 15,173 in 2017 and 16,393 in 2015, as documented by Israel’s Immigration and Population Authority, which records all Jewish and Arab exists and entries via Israel’s land, air and sea international passages.

*A 32% artificial inflation of Palestinian births was documented by the World Bank (page 8, item 6) in a 2006 audit. While the Palestinian Authority claimed an 8% increase in the number of births, the World Bank detected a 24% decrease.

*The aforementioned data documents 1.4 million Arabs in Judea and Samaria, when deducting the aforementioned documented-data (1.6 million) from the official Palestinian number (3 million).

The bottom line

*The US should derive much satisfaction from Israel’s demographic viability and therefore, Israel’s enhanced posture of deterrence, which is the US’ top force and dollar multiplier in the Middle East and beyond.

*In 1897, there was a 9% Jewish minority in the combined area of pre-1967 Israel, Judea and Samaria, expanding to a 39% minority in 1947. In 2023, there is a 69% Jewish majority (7.5mn Jews, 2mn Israeli Arabs and 1.4mn Arabs in Judea and Samaria), benefitting from a robust demographic tailwind of births and migration.

*In contrast to conventional wisdom, there is no Arab demographic time bomb.  There is, however, a robust Jewish demographic tailwind.

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Videos

The post-1967 turning point of US-Israel cooperation

Israeli benefits to the US taxpayer exceed US foreign aid to Israel

Iran - A Clear And Present Danger To The USA

Exposing the myth of the Arab demographic time bomb